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Negligent Management of Corporations
Raymond C. Loyer*
T HE SUBJECT OF NEGLIGENT MANAGEMENT of corporations is a
broad field for one article. Yet, in one article many facets
of corporation management can be brought together in one place.
A review of the literature reveals that specific matters which
relate to negligent management can be found in many widely
separated sections of reference works, and piecemeal in separate
articles. Most articles seem to explore a particular field of cor-
porate management in which negligence is a small factor.
Negligence in corporate management is not treated differently
than negligence in most other fields of activity. Requirement
of proof of causal relationship has been preserved even in the
statutes of the various states in their attempts to specifically
fix responsibility.'
Due to widespread use of certain terms by the courts, it is
well to distinguish at the beginning the terminology used in
practice. Because the directors (and also the officers) of a corpo-
ration are usually considered to be in positions of trust (and in
some jurisdictions directors are considered to be agents) the
terms "misfeasance" and nonfeasance" are frequently used.
Both are used in referring to negligence. The distinction is made
thus:
* * * 'Nonfeasance' means the total omission or failure of an
agent to enter upon the performance of some distinct duty
or undertaking which he has agreed with his principal to
do .... But if he once begins the performance of such acts
and in doing so fails or omits to do certain acts which he
should have done, whereby a third person is injured, it is
not nonfeasance but misfeasance.
2
Of course negligence can be read into both terms. Directors
can, at the same time and by the same set of facts, be liable to
different parties on both counts. Mere acceptance of the position
can be called the beginning of performance. Thus misfeasance
by way of nonfeasance may be possible.
* B.S., John Carroll Univ., third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 3 Fletcher, Private Corporations 606 (Perm. ed. rev. 1947); 2 Oleck,
Modern Corporation Law, chaps. 39, 40 (1959) state by state digests of
statutes.
2 26 Words and Phrases 182 (Perm. ed., 1953).
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Who Can Be Guilty of Negligent Management
While the history of the subject has rested on the basis that
directors of a corporation are the sole managers, there are others
in the organization who share the prospect of being held to
account in a court of law. Presidents,3 executive committees, 4
and general managers have been held liable for negligent man-
agement. Thus, where a member of management habitually
disregards by-laws and rules of executive committees, all the
officers may be held liable in negligence for permitting that to
go on when losses result from the transactions of the one doing
the actual wrong.
The standard of care required of officers appears to be
nearly the same as that of directors, yet, unless there is fraud
or financial profit made by offending officers, they seldom are
held liable.5 The rule of the "ordinary prudent man" is normally
applied. They are charged with the knowledge which could be
gained by an ordinary or routine inspection of the company
books. As an example of how loosely this rule is applied, a gen-
eral manager was held liable for his negligence only after it was
shown that the company secretary had been overpaying himself
for seven years and when discovered by the general manager,
was allowed to remain in his position, during which time more
money was taken.6
There is some difference in the standard of care required of
officers from that required of directors. Consideration is given
to the subordinate officer's added responsibility for day-to-day
operation as opposed to the director's responsibility for overall
supervision. A bank president was held liable for not discover-
ing a clever fraud by the bookkeeper. In the same case the
directors were found blameless, since only close scrutiny and
day-to-day checking could have disclosed the embezzlement.7
3 Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Wiseman, 103 Tex. 286, 124 S. W.
621 (1910); Doe v. Northwestern Coal & Transportation Co., 78 F. 62 (C. C.
Ore. 1896); Carter v. Forbes Lithograph Mfg. Co., 22 Tex. 549, 56 S. W. 227(1900).
4 Williams v. McKay, 46 N. J. Eq. 25, 18 A. 824 (1889).
5 Commercial Germania Trust & Savings Bank v. Jurgens, 134 La. 755, 64
S. 703 (1913); David Reus Permanent Loan & Savings Co. v. Conrad, 101
Md. 224, 60A 737 (1905); Drucklieb v. Harris, 84 Misc. Rep. 291, 147 N. Y. S.
298 (1914); Killen v. State Bank, 106 Wis. 546, 82 N. W. 536 (1900).
6 Johnson v. Stoughton Wagon Co., 118 Wis. 438, 95 N. W. 394 (1903); Long
v. Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P. 2d 242 (1943).
7 Bates v. Dresser, 251 U. S. 524 (1920); Milburn v. Martin, 190 Ark. 16, 76
S. W. 2d 952 (1934); Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F. 2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936).
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Although subordinate officers are liable for negligent man-
agement, directors can take little comfort in that fact. Directors
are always the first to be scrutinized when a corporation gets
into trouble. Where a committee had made bad investments
during the vacation period of the board of directors, the directors
were held negligent even though it was shown that directors of
like businesses took vacations at that time of the year. They
were said to have assumed the risk of negligence while on va-
cation. The Supreme Court of New York reversed that decision
as being too harsh with directors.8 Generally speaking, however,
the directors are liable for negligence through delegation of
management powers to committees and subordinates followed
by a lack of diligence in supervision of their activities. This was
done by a Nebraska court which cited the reversed opinion of
the lower New York court, above mentioned, to fix liability on
the directors.9 This aspect of management will be taken up more
fully below.
The liability of officers is based on the principles of agency.
They are considered agents of the corporation and not of the
directors. When the courts describe the authority of corporate
officers concerning general activities of management, they con-
fine them strictly to agency rules. Thus older cases viewed the
liability of subordinate officers for negligence as governed by the
normal rules of agency and required the showing of gross negli-
gence verging on fraud.'0 The modern trend, however, is to
treat corporate officers as having a fiduciary relationship toward
the corporation closer to that of trustees than to that of agents,"
This gives rise to some hope for directors that in the future the
risk of liability for negligence will be lowered by the process of
spreading out the targets for suit.
Director's Relationship to the Corporation
To better understand the various views of a director's
liability for negligent management, a look at what relation the
8 Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 147 App. Div. 281, 131 N. Y. S.
1059 (1911).
9 Ashby v. Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258 N. W. 639 (1935).
10 Cushman v. Cloverland Coal & Mining Co., 170 Ind. 402, 84 N. E. 759
(1908); Patterson v. Stewart, 41 Minn. 84, 42 N. W. 926 (1889); Devlin v.
Moore, 64 Ore. 433, 130 P. 35 (1913).
11 Dwyer v. Tracey, 118 F. Supp. 289 (N. D. Ill. 1954); Electronic Develop-
ment Co. v. Robson, 148 Neb. 526, 28 N. W. 2d 130 (1947); Murphy v. Han-
Ion, 322 Mass. 683, 79 N. E. 2d 292 (1948).
Sept., 1960
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courts find between the directors and their corporation and
stockholders is helpful. Negligence in any field of activity is
difficult to define in precise terms of specific actions or inactions.
The relation between the injured party and the wrongdoer plays
a large role in determining the requirement of duty. This is
especially true in corporate management, where the injured
party is an artificial creature of the law.
The relationships determined by case law leave much to be
desired. The cases seem to fall into no set pattern. The older
opinions speak in general terms about directors being agents
or trustees. Yet, in the same cases the final decisions rendered
often are not specifically connected to either term.12 There ap-
pears to have been realization that there is some fiduciary duty
between the directors on the one hand and the corporation and
stockholders on the other; but the older cases seemed unable to
interpret this into general rules of law.
The same uncertainty, or at least questionable nomenclature,
exists today. Most modem cases treat directors as having fiduci-
ary duties "like" trustees, because they handle as their own
property in which someone else has an interest.I3 This also applies
to stockholders as a body.14 The cases speak of a fiduciary duty
owed to minority stockholders; but a stockholder cannot sue
for negligent management where the corporation itself could
not sue.15
Vague analyses and descriptive phrases about this relation,
ship between the director and his corporation are numerous.
But usually what is said in one case may cause difficulty to
another court if that description is lifted from the context of
facts about which the original court was speaking. As happens
so often in negligence cases, each case must be considered in the
light of its own circumstances. Perhaps one clarifying concept
would be for the courts to recognize the double status which
directors occupy. This status is well described by a noted text
writer as follows:
To sum up, directors and managing officers, in addition to
their function as mere agents, occupy a double position of
partial trust; they are quasi or sub modo trustees for the
12 Slee v. Bloom, 20 Johns 669 (1838); Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Par-
ish, 42 Md. 598 (1875); Parker v. Nickerson, 112 Mass. 195 (1873).
13 Hunt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F. 2d 52 (5th Cir. 1947); Palmer
v. Chamberlin, 191 F. 2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951).
14 3 Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 1, at 173.
15 Kaiser v. Easton, 151 Cal. App. 2d 307, 311 P. 2d 108 (1957).
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corporation with respect to corporate property and they
are quasi or sub modo trustees for the stockholders with
respect to their shares of stock.
16
Modern decisions and writers are pushing towards a stricter
"trustee-like" relationship. In California the court has applied
to corporate directors the same status that is applicable to techni-
cal trustees. 17 This is at least a clear designation, and will un-
doubtedly raise the standard of care required of directors.
The above description should not be lightly extended beyond
the field of negligence. Other status-relationships are being em-
ployed between directors and their corporation when other
aspects of corporate management are considered."'
Standard of Care
Negligence in corporate management is not treated very
differently than in other activities. In order to find a person
negligent, there must be some standard of behavior presupposed
which the law requires to be maintained, and proof that this
standard was not maintained.19
There are some areas of corporate management which the
courts have scrupulously regarded as outside their scope of
review with regard to setting a standard of care. One is the
area of discretionary acts involved in the mechanics of operating
a going business. Some writers classify this as the "Business
Judgment Rule." The rule simply stated is that the courts will
not second guess the directors.20 To receive the benefit of this
rule, all that is required is a showing by the directors that a
positive decision to do something was made. If the complainant
sets forth a better way of doing whatever was done, or that a
possible course of action was not even considered by the di-
rectors, the court usually will merely state that the directors
are not to be considered perfect and infallible. Also the courts
16 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 267 (5th ed. 1941); see Boyd v. Mutual
Fire Ass'n., 116 Wis. 155, 94 N. W. 171 (1903).
17 2 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law 735 (1959), citing Calif. Civ. Code
§ 2230 as discussed in North Confidence Min. & Dev. Co. v. Fitch, 58 Cal.
App. 329, 208 P. 328 (1922).
18 3 Id., at 626, speaks of a "fairness" test rather than trustee status test.
19 Prosser, Law of Torts 124 (2d ed. 1955).
20 Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Otis & Co. v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E. D. Pa. 1946); McLeod v. Lewis-Clark
Hotel Co., 66 Idaho 584, 164 P. 2d 195 (1945); Rous v. Carlisle, 261 App.
Div. 432, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 197 (1941); Diston v. Loucks, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 138
(1941); Garvin v. Anderson, 334 Mich. 287, 54 N. W. 2d 667 (1952).
Sept.,l190
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avoid substituting their own judgment on business matters or
unduly interfering with the internal affairs of the corporation.
There is sense to this, because if it were otherwise, a board of
directors would be afraid to make a decision in a controversial
matter. Modern problems of group decisions in corporate man-
agement are hard enough without making the courts a member
of every group.
The idea of the rule is that the mere fact that a decision was
made, providing that good faith is exercised by the directors,
shows that at least some diligence was applied.21 Recent de-
cisions have limited this rule with respect to "good faith"
decisions of directors. Where their actions are plainly illegal
and where the penalty imposed for violation is more than any
advantage gained, the rule is not applied.22
Another general aspect considered by the courts in deter-
mining a standard of care for directors is the size of the cor-
poration. The law does not require the same degree of care to
be exercised by directors of small family corporations as it does
for large corporations.23
The type of business is also considered in determining a
standard of care. Banking directors have been held to a higher
standard of care than directors in other businesses.24 This is
probably due to the fact that stockholders of banks have been
held personally liable for bank debts, and as a result, litigation
against directors has suggested itself more readily than in ordi-
nary businesses where stockholders are relatively safe. The
trustee analogy has had its chief use in banking cases. The stand-
ard of care required by most courts is that degree of care ordi-
narily used by prudent bankers. 25 Hun v. Cary26 is considered a
leading case in determining a standard of care for directors. This
was a banking case and the rule involved is considered to be
stricter than that applied to directors of other corporations. The
21 Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., supra note 20.
22 Downing v. Howard, 162 F. 2d 654 (3rd Cir. 1947); Abrams v. Allen, 297
N. Y. 52, 74 N. E. 2d 305 (1947); Clayton v. Tarish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N. Y. S.
2d 727 (1947).
23 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 667 (1940); Hughes v. W. 0. Hughes Coal
Co., 175 N. Y. S. 2d 478 (1957).
24 Litwin v. Allen, supra note 2; O'Conner v. Bankers Trust Co., 159 Misc.
920, 289 N. Y. S. 252 (1936); Gull v. Corwell, 118 W. Va. 263, 190 S. E. 130
(1937).
25 Litwin v. Allen, supra note 23.
26 82 N. Y. 65 (1880).
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problem that was considered in this case was that of stating a
standard of conduct that would not discourage people from be-
coming bank directors, nor yet leave depositors at the mercy of
careless administration of their savings. A middle course was
followed, which laid down the rule that directors must exercise
the same degree of care and prudence which men of common
prudence would ordinarily exercise in their own affairs. The
analogy to trustees found in cases not involving banks is bor-
rowed from banking cases.2 7
The degree of care required of the directors of ordinary
business corporations has been stated in many ways. It is gen-
erally recognized that each case must be determined in view of
all the circumstances of that particular case. What may be no
negligence in one case may be actionable negligence in another.
The character of the company, the condition of its business
and other relevant facts are taken into consideration. Thus,
loaning of money without sufficient security has been held to be
actionable negligence when done by directors of a life insurance
company, and to be mere poor judgment when done by a loan
company.28
There are two major views as to what standard of care the
law requires. The majority view follows Hun v. Cary.28s Adoption
of that case rule in non-banking cases has produced a rule which
requires directors to exercise ordinary care and diligence over
the appointment and supervision of corporate officers. As stated
in the Uniform Business Corporation Act, Section 3329
The degree of care . . . which ordinarily prudent men
(prompted by self interest) would exercise under similar
circumstances.
This statement follows the trend of the courts to find a
trustee-like relationship between the corporation and directors.
It affixes to directors the same responsibility over corporate
management which they already have over their own affairs.
The other leading statement of a standard of care requires
27 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132 (1891). This case is a landmark for de-
termining director's liability. It is a banking case, but until recent years
was cited in cases and texts as setting the standard of care for directors
generally.
28 New Haven Trust Co. v. Doherty, 75 Conn. 555, 54 A. 209 (1903); Williams
v. Fidelity Loan & Savings Co., 142 Va. 43, 128 S. E. 615 (1925); Winston v.
Gordon, 115 Va. 912, 80 S. E. 756 (1914).
28a See supra note 26.
29 9 U. L. A. 186 (1957).
Sept., 1960
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a lesser degree of diligence. It is that degree of care which is
expected of ordinarily prudent directors of like business or-
ganizations. The usages of the particular business are considered.
It is usually stated that, if a director discharges his duties in a
manner ordinarily performed by directors of like businesses in
that area, he cannot be held guilty of negligence. 30 In juris-
dictions following this standard of care, it appears that they do
not follow the trustee analogy closely but rather follow the
agency type of relationship. This approach seems to be giving way
to the higher standard, as there are few recent cases following
this rule.3
When an opinion states that a factor to be considered is "the
spirit of the times," this plainly demonstrates the need for care-
ful analysis of each case before relying on the rules there
applied.3 2  Therefore, the specific actions which will render
directors liable cannot be stated. Some overall aspects of di-
rectorship can be discussed with regard to negligence. Thus,
ignorance of corporate affairs may render a director liable. In
the general supervisory position which he occupies he must
keep himself informed of not only the state of business, but
also of the activities of the top management of the company.
If subordinate officers cause harm to the corporation either
through their own negligence or by actual fraud, and the di-
rectors could have stopped them, the directors are held to have
been negligent when reasonable investigation would have brought
such action to light. The director cannot plead ignorance in
order to escape liability, because this would put a premium on
inactivity. A director is chargeable with any knowledge which
would have come to him had he paid reasonable attention to
the activities of his subordinates.33
Delegation of authority is necessary in the situation of a
director, but he is held to have a duty of reasonable supervision.
Even jurisdictions following the theory of "agency and gross
negligence for liability" have closely scrutinized directors of a
corporation in which officers have been loosely supervised. In
general, it will be found that the failure of directors to use
30 Devlin v. Moore, supra note 10.
31 Keck Enterprises v. Braunschweiger, 108 F. Supp. 925 (S. D. Cal. 1952).
32 Williams v. Fidelity Loan & Savings Co., supra note 28; Mann v. Com-
monwealth Bond Corp., 27 F. Supp. 315 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
33 Van Schaich v. Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 550 (1939); Cameron
v. Kenyon-Connally Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 P. 358 (1899).
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ordinary care in supervision is viewed as equal to gross neglect
of duty.3
4
In banking cases, the theory of imputed knowledge is carried
further. In many cases, the president of the bank is left in
general charge of the business and has held a position of high
trust and confidence for many years. Under these circumstances,
the directors will have imputed to them the knowledge of the
activities of the president who has done some unauthorized act.
In order to protect a third party, the court imputes the knowl-
edge of the unauthorized act to the directors, and then under
rules of agency holds that a ratification has taken place or that
an apparent agency has been created.35 These cases may
not always be negligence suits, but when the company has
lost money through an unauthorized act of a subordinate officer
and ratification by neglect is determined, the door is left wide
open for a negligence suit against the directors.
Again relying on the rules of agency, the courts have re-
stricted the application of the theory of imputed knowledge. In
cases where a special agent hired for a particular purpose has
exceeded his authority, the directors are freed from liability on
the basis that no apparent authority could be found. Something
must put the directors on notice that there is need of their
special interest.3 6 A recent case has held that when an unauthor-
ized act was reported to the board of directors in a casual man-
ner, no duty upon the individual directors to elicit further
facts could be compelled. In this case there was no retention
of any benefits of the alleged unauthorized act.37 A dissent in
that case stated that the directors should have been held to
know of the unauthorized act through the theory of imputed
knowledge, which would amount to treating their inaction as
ratification.
Another limitation on the theory of imputed knowledge is
made indirectly by the rules of evidence. The accounts and
books of a corporation are not per se competent evidence on
behalf of the corporation in an action against the directors.
38
34 McEwen v. Kelly, 140 Ga. 720, 79 S. E. 777; Griffon v. State, 142 Ga. 636,
83 S. E. 540 (1914); Woodward v. Stewart, 149 Ga. 620, 101 S. E. 749 (1919).
35 Martin v. Webb, 3 S. Ct. 428, 110 U. S. (1884).
36 Edlestone v. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co., 84 N. H. 315, 150 A. 545 (1930).
37 Home Savings Bank v. Gerstenback, 270 Wis. 386, 71 N. W. 2d 347 (1955).
s .idd v, Robinson, 126 N, Y: 113 26 N, E, 1046 (1891),
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It would be a dangerous rule to place the burden of close ex-
amination of all book entries upon the directors.
The same treatment as above is given to individual directors
in cases in which misconduct is charged. The individual director
is not chargeable with the loss resulting from the misconduct
of other directors unless he had knowledge of such conduct or
through his neglect did not know of it.' 9 In negligence suits a
broad charge of negligence against the board of directors, without
charging neglect against an individual director, will be held to
be insufficient.
40
Volumes could be written on the various situations upon
which a court could find directors liable for negligence. We
speak here only of the general type of supervising management
with which directors are most often charged. Most factual
situations can be placed under the broad headings of business
judgment, attentiveness to corporate affairs, and duty to fellow
directors. There is no general rule, which, when followed by a
director, will absolve him of liability. Only by exercising honest
positive action, using the ordinary intelligence with which he is
endowed, can he feel in some way secure. Even if wrong in
business, he may at the same time be right in law.
Remedies, Summarized
The chief means of recovery of damages to a corporation
through negligence of its management is a stockholder's deriva-
tive suit brought in behalf of the corporation. The cause of
action usually belongs to the corporation 4 and it is the real
party in interest.42 The corporation is, therefore, a necessary
party and must be joined.43 Since the type of action is brought
in a representative capacity by the stockholder, he must show
either that the corporation has refused or neglected his demand
that it sue in its own behalf or show facts which clearly indicate
that such request would have been useless.44
The suit is brought in equity, since this type of suit was an
invention for want of an adequate remedy at law to redress the
39 3 Fletcher op. cit. supra note 1, at 639.
40 Fisher v. Graver, 80 F. 590 (S. D. N. Y. 1897).
41 Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 181 N. Y. 121, 73 N. E. 562 (1905).
42 Rettinger v. Pierpont, 145 Neb. 161, 15 N. W. 2d 393 (1944).
43 Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, 202 F. 2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
44 Kavanaugh v. Wetmore, 103 App. Div. 95, 92 N. Y. S. 543 (1905).
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breach of a fiduciary duty by corporate managers. 45 If there is
also an issue which requires a jury and which involves an
action at law in addition to the equitable right, under modern
liberal rules of practice they may be brought together or sepa-
rately.46
This last point has caused difficulty, for example with re-
gard to the defense of the statute of limitations. It has been
held in Ohio that although the derivative action by a stockholder
is in equity, the suit if brought by the corporation would have
been one at law and thus the statute of limitations applicable
to actions at law applies and not the statute applicable to
equity.4
7
In order to hold directors liable for negligence, the basis of
liability, that is specific conduct producing the loss, must be
stated in the pleading with accuracy and clearness. There must
be specific allegations against named directors, or else the
petition is demurrable. 4 Negligence in general, or simple con-
clusions that the business was negligently managed, are insuffi-
cient.
49
Judge Learned Hand gave a good review of the requirements
necessary in the pleading and proof of a negligence suit against
corporate directors in Barnes v. Andrew.50 There must be an
existence of a duty; a specific showing of negligence in perform-
ing that duty; and a specific loss incurred through such negli-
gence which would have been avoided if reasonable diligence
had been observed. The burden of proof of all the points is on
the one alleging the negligence. 51
Modern statutes, while mostly not creating any new liabili-
ties of directors, have broadened the class of people able to sue,
but negligence must still be shown in the same manner as at
common law.
5 2
The common law has generally refused to permit the cor-
poration to pay the legal fees of directors when they have suc-
45 Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, supra note 43.
46 Ibid.
47 Jensen v. Republic Steel Corp., 32 Ohio L. Ab. 29 (1939).
48 American Life Insurance Co. v. Powell, 262 Ala. 560, 80 S. 2d 487 (1955).
49 Ibid.
50 298 F. 614 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
51 Ibid.
52 Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 1, at 880.
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cessfully defended themselves in a mismanagement suit. How-
ever, many state statutes now permit the corporation to reim-
burse them. Provisions to this effect also may be found in the
by-laws of the company. 53 "Security for suit expense" statutes
also are involved in some states.5 4
The matters of pleading and practice in stockholders' actions
are too complex to warrant treatment here.55
Summary
While by no means exhaustive, this article recounts the main
issues involved in negligent management situations. The law ap-
pears to be tending to enforce higher standards on the part of di-
rectors. Since modern business, in the main, is done by large
corporations to which great numbers of people of modest means
have entrusted their savings, this direction of the law is to the
benefit of modern society.
53 Bishop, Current Status of Corporate Directors, Right to Reimbursement,
69 Harv. L. R. 1062 (1956).
54 3 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law 663 (1959).
55 See texts, such as 3 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, chap. 63 (1959).
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